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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recreational cannabis was legalized in Canada over a year ago.
Canada became only the second country, after Uruguay, and eleven
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American states, to legalize recreational cannabis.1 However, the black
market continues to supply 83.9–88% of the market since it is significantly
cheaper than legal cannabis.2 Marijuana represents nearly half of the $300
billion dollar global illegal narcotics market and is the drug of choice for
most of the world’s 250 million illicit drug–users.3 Much has been written
on the role that justice debt plays in the cycle of poverty.4 To that end,
legalizing cannabis not only deprives organized crime of its single biggest
source of income but also protects consumers from the debts associated
with its criminalization. Canadian policymakers also had to consider other
aspects of legalization, including how it fits into existing commercial law,
the appropriate level of tax, and restrictions on its sale.
However, it remains unclear how the new industry will fare with the
inevitable commercial bankruptcies. As with all other sectors in the
economy, the cannabis industry relies on certainty to deal with financial
failure. Getting this policy wrong can discourage entrepreneurial activity
and new business growth. Thus, the improvement of a country’s
bankruptcy system is crucial to realize the benefits of legal recreational
cannabis. This article asks a question that has received less consideration–
how should countries’ legal systems deal with inevitable financial failure
in this newly legal industry? With legalization comes new opportunities
for investment and innovation, from growers, to brick and mortar stores,
to “weed tech” and breakthrough science. A well-developed method for
dealing with financial failure in this industry is crucial to avoid the fear of
the unknown, which is holding the industry and its many beneficiaries
back.

1

Jeremy Berke & Skye Gould, Legal Marijuana Just Went on Sale in Illinois. Here Are
All the States Where Cannabis is Legal, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2020),
https://www.businessinsider.com/legal-marijuana-states-2018-1.
2
Statistics Canada, CANNABIS ECONONMIC ACCOUNT, THIRD QUARTER 2018 (Nov. 21,
2018),
http://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/en/daily-quotidien/181121/dq181121deng.pdf?st=DF5bSH5a; Marcy Nicholson, RBC Pegs Legal Pot Sales at 12% of Market as
Illicit Prices Seen Dropping, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Oct. 9, 2019),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/robcannabispro/article-rbc-pegs-legal-pot-sales-at-12of-market-as-illicit-prices-seen/.
3
The Right Way to do Drugs, THE ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/leaders/2016/02/13/the-right-way-to-do-drugs.
4
See e.g., Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Arash Nayerahmadi, Over-Indebted Criminals in Canada
42 MAN. L. J. 207 (2019); Pat O’Malley, THE CURRENCY OF JUSTICE: FINES AND DAMAGES
IN CONSUMER SOCIETIES, (Routledge-Cavendish, 2009); Abbye Atkinson, Consumer
Bankruptcy, Nondischargeability, and Penal Debt, 70 VAND. L. REV. 917 (2017).
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This article offers an evaluation of Canada’s approach to addressing
financial failure in this industry. It also seeks to provide insights for
Canada’s law reform process, as well as for countries including Mexico,
South Africa, and New Zealand as they continue to evaluate reforms to the
treatment of cannabis. Part I reviews the businesses risks involved in
entering the legal cannabis market. Part II considers the acceptance of the
cannabis industry by capital markets. Part III reviews the insolvency
processes and challenges that exist for cannabis companies, including in
the United States for comparison. Part IV provides a narrative on the best
practices for cannabis legalization and areas for reform. Part V suggests
that while Canada’s insolvency system could benefit from reform, a
significant external benefit of legalization of recreational cannabis may be
the potential for American companies to use the Canadian bankruptcy
system while it remains illegal federally in the United States. Part VI
concludes.

II.

BUSINESS RISKS
MARKET:

IN

ENTERING

THE

LEGAL CANNABIS

Governments are able to generate substantial revenue from taxing the
legal sale of cannabis. As a result, it is in their best interests to have as
many licensed cannabis producers, sellers, cultivators, processors, and
retailers as is practical in order to eliminate the black market. That being
said, the potential for oversaturation in the cannabis market is a serious
concern for current and future business owners. If supply outstrips
demand, cannabis businesses may not be able to generate enough revenue
to cover their business expenses and, inevitably, some will fail.

a. Oversaturation
In Canada, the cannabis market has not yet become oversaturated. For
example, Ontario capped the retail marijuana licenses that would be issued
at 25, despite receiving 17,320 expressions of interest.5 An additional 50
retail licenses will be issued after October 2019, eight of which will be for

5

Cannabis Act Regulations, O. Reg. 468/18, § 8.1(2) (Can.); The Canadian Press, Race on
to Partner with Ontario’s Cannabis Retail License Winners, CBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2019),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/cannabis-licence-retail-1.4977773.
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dispensaries on reserves.6 In contrast, British Columbia is not limiting the
number of retail cannabis licenses that can be issued.7 As of November 5,
2019, there were 160 licensed cannabis retailers in that province.8
Saskatchewan is taking a phased approach, where 51 cannabis retail
licenses were available in the first round of license allocations.9 Depending
on the demand for more retail licenses, the province may allocate
additional licenses in a second round of applications.10
Health Canada, which has the authority to issue seller, cultivator, and
processor licenses, does not currently limit number of licenses that can be
issued.11 That being said, it is possible that the Canadian cannabis market
could become oversaturated due to the lack of a license cap from the
Western provinces. If oversupply occurs, the price of cannabis will drop,
potentially leading to solvency issues for producers and dispensers.
The problem of oversaturation could be exacerbated by a lack of brand
loyalty in the cannabis industry. Unlike alcohol or tobacco, which had
multiple established brands before advertising was restricted, cannabis
brands are establishing themselves in a constrained environment. For
instance, companies are not allowed to present their products in a way that
associates its brand with “glamour, recreation, excitement, vitality, risk or
daring.”12 Provincial governments can place further restrictions on “brand-

6

News Release, Ministry of the Attorney Gen., Gov’t of Ont., Ontario Moving Forward
with
Next
Round
of
Cannabis
Stores
(July
3,
2019),
http://news.ontario.ca/mag/en/2019/07/ontario-moving-forward-with-next-round-ofcannabis-stores.html.
7
Retailers,
B.C.
LIQUOR
DISTRIBUTION
BRANCH,
http://www.bcldbcannabisupdates.com/opportunities/retailers (last visited Jan. 30, 2020)
(scroll down to FAQ and click on “Q. Will there be a cap on the number of cannabis retail
licenses in BC?”).
8
Application Statistics, PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (Jan. 27, 2020),
http://justice.gov.bc.ca/cannabislicensing/policy-document/application-stats.
9
Press Release, Saskatchewan Liquor and Gaming Authority, CANNABIS RETAILERS
SELECTED (June 1, 2018), http://www.saskatchewan.ca/government/news-andmedia/2018/june/01/cannabis-retailers-selected.
10
Frequently Asked Questions, SASKATCHEWAN LIQUOR AND GAMING AUTHORITY,
http://www.slga.com/faqs#group-4-15 (last visited July 16, 2019) (scroll down to “4.15
Cannabis Legalization”).
11
Cannabis Licensing Application Guide: Cultivation, Processing and Sale for Medical
Purposes, HEALTH CANADA, 4 (2018), https://www.canada.ca/content/dam/hcsc/documents/services/drugs-medication/cannabis/industry-licenseesapplicants/licensing-summary/guide/clag-eng.pdf.
12
Cannabis Act, S.C. 2016, c. 16, § 17(1)(e) (Can.).
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preference” promotions, including branded apparel.13 Other strategies that
may encourage customer loyalty, including points programs, may violate
federal rules, although the scope of that prohibition remains unclear.14
Finally, the lack of adequate legal supply in some markets is diminishing
brand loyalty.15 A customer who might prefer the product from one
company may purchase cannabis from another if that is all that is available
at their local dispensary. These factors contribute to a challenging
environment for new players seeking to differentiate their product in the
marketplace.

b. Regulatory Requirements & License Suspensions
As a new industry, the regulatory risk for the cannabis industry is high.
Federal and provincial regulators across the country have made numerous
changes to cannabis regulations in the short time that it has been legal.16
As a result, if cannabis businesses operators are not up to date with the
latest regulations, they risk having their license revoked or suspended,
which would prohibit the business from operating and earning revenues.17
These regulatory changes can have major financial consequences for
new or potential license-holders. For example, Health Canada recently
announced that new applicants must have a fully-built site compliant with
the Cannabis Regulations at the time of their application.18 Before it was

13

Susan Krashinsky Robertson, Buying Blind: Cannabis Marketing Restrictions Leave
Little Brand Awareness in the New Recreational Market, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 7,
2019),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/business/article-buying-blind-cannabismarketing-restrictions-leave-little-brand/.
14
Solomon Israel, City Weed Stores’ Loyalty-Points Program May Not be Legal, Lawyers
Say, THE LEAF (Apr. 11, 2019), http://www.theleafnews.com/news/city-weed-storesloyalty-points-program-may-not-be-legal-lawyers-say-508455382.html.
15
Kristine Owram, Canada’s Pot Market is Still Struggling to Meet Demand and it’s About
to
Get
Much
Worse,
FINANCIAL
POST
(June
5,
2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/canadas-shambolic-pot-market-will-soon-getmuch-worse.
16
Jason Herring, Retailers Left in a Haze as New Cannabis Promotion Rules Announced,
EDMONTON JOURNAL (Sept. 13, 2019), https://edmontonjournal.com/news/localnews/new-cannabis-promotion-rules-limit-sign-size/.
17
Victor Ferreira, CannTrust Slides Further After Health Canada Suspends Cannabis
Licenses,
FINANCIAL
POST
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-business/canntrusts-licence-toproduce-and-sell-cannabis-suspended-by-health-canada.
18
Press Release, Health Canada, Statement from Health Canada on Changes to Cannabis
Licensing
(May
8,
2019),
http://www.canada.ca/en/health-
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a requirement to be granted a license, 70% of applicants who passed the
initial paper-based application did not provide evidence about their
facility.19 Health Canada was concerned that it was expending scarce
resources reviewing paper applications for applicants who may not be in a
position to begin operations if they received a license.20 Although
requiring applicants to have a fully built site before they apply may speed
up the licensing process, these new rules will negatively affect cannabis
entrepreneurs’ ability to access capital, likely depressing the number of
license applicants.
Before the licensing changes, applicants who were in the queue to
have their applications reviewed would receive a pre-approval letter from
Health Canada.21 This pre-approval helped reassure investors that a license
would be forthcoming and made it easier for entrepreneurs to secure
capital. Often these funds were used to build a production facility that
would be compliant with the applicable regulations. Therefore, with the
new requirements, it is more likely that new cannabis players will be shut
out of the market or have short stints in the cannabis industry. As a result,
the established cannabis players have an additional advantage to new
market entrants, making it more likely that the new players will be forced
into insolvency or be acquired by larger businesses.
With the legalization of recreational cannabis, the cultivation,
processing, and distribution of the substance has become highly regulated
in an attempt to prevent the sale of cannabis on the black market, and to
ensure that consumers are receiving safe, high quality product. If Health
Canada becomes aware that a licensed cannabis company is selling
cannabis from an unauthorized source, they can suspend or revoke its
license. If this happens, that company will not be able to continue
operations, to their financial detriment. Bonify Medical Cannabis
(“Bonify”), a cannabis retailer in Manitoba, provides a recent example of

canada/news/2019/05/statement-from-health-canada-on-changes-to-cannabislicensing.html.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Vanmala Subramaniam, To Apply for a License to Grow Cannabis in Canada, You Now
Have to Have a Fully Built Site Ready to Go, FINANCIAL POST (May 8, 2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/to-apply-for-a-licence-to-grow-cannabis-younow-need-to-have-a-fully-built-site-ready-to-go.
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how this process can unfold.22 Health Canada suspended Bonify’s license
for not complying with the requisite production practices after an
investigator claimed that senior managers brought 200kgs of unlicensed
cannabis into the production facility.23 The provincial regulator also
suspended the sale of Bonify products.24 Bonify’s CEO said that the
company could function without sales for as long as a year while the
license suspension was being appealed.25 It was reinstated after eight
months.26 Had the suspension been longer, or Bonify less-capitalized, it is
likely that the company’s fixed expenses would have made the company
insolvent while the license was suspended.
In some instances, a company may choose to suspend its sales in an
effort to comply with a Health Canada investigation. CannTrust, one of
Canada’s largest cannabis companies, suspended the sale of its product on
July 8, 2019, after Health Canada became aware of five unlicensed rooms
producing cannabis.27 Health Canada froze the use of 5,200 kilograms of
cannabis that was produced in the unlicensed rooms and CannTrust
voluntarily put a hold on an additional 7,500 kilograms of cannabis.28 In
response, CannTrust’s stock price plummeted 37%.29 Once Health Canada
completed its investigation into the company’s illegal business practices,
it cancelled CannTrust’s license to sell and produce cannabis for growing

22

Susan Montoya Bryan, Health Canada Suspends License of Winnipeg Cannabis
Producer
Bonify,
CBC
NEWS
(Feb.
5,
2019),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/bonify-recalled-cannabis-manitoba-1.5007446.
23
Id.; see also Cannabis Regulations, SOR/2018-144, §§ 79–92 (Can.) (information on the
good production practices).
24
Id.
25
Ian Froese, RCMP Not Investigating Winnipeg Cannabis Producer That Sold
Unauthorized
Weed,
CBC
NEWS
(Mar.
25,
2019),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/bonify-cannabis-producer-no-charges-rcmplawsuit-dismissal-1.5070578.
26
David George-Cosh, Bonify’s Pot Sales License Reinstated by Health Canada After 8Month
Suspension,
BNN
BLOOMBERG
(Oct.
23,
2019),
http://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/bonify-s-pot-sales-licence-reinstated-by-health-canadaafter-8-month-suspension-1.1336398.
27
Victor Ferreira, CannTrust Whistleblower Says Health Canada Would Never Have
Found Unlicensed Rooms Without Him, FINANCIAL POST (July 12, 2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/investing/canntrust-whistleblower-believes-healthcanada-would-never-have-found-unlicensed-rooms-without-him.
28
Peter Evans, CannTrust’s Cannabis Sale Put on Hold by Health Canada for Unlicensed
Growing, CBC NEWS (Jul. 8, 2018), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canntrust-healthcanada-1.5203578.
29
Ferreira, supra note 27.
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illegal cannabis.30 In order to regain regulatory compliance, CannTrust
agreed to destroy $12 million worth of plants, and $65 million worth of
inventory.31 In late October 2019, the company announced that it had laid
off a quarter of its workforce in a bid to reduce its expenses until its license
can be reinstated.32 If the license is not reinstated within 35 weeks of the
temporary layoffs, CannTrust will be responsible for $800,000 in
severance payments.33 It remains to be seen if the company will be able to
recover from its loss of investor, shareholder, and regulatory confidence,
or will require insolvency proceedings.
In summary, if Health Canada suspended or revoked a licence, or
opened an investigation, it could affect a cannabis company’s ability to
generate cash flow. This would make it difficult, particularly for new or
small businesses, to cover its fixed expenses, such as rent, wages, and any
monthly interest payments. Cannabis companies must be diligent in
following the mandated regulations for cannabis production and
distribution in order to remain operational licensed cannabis companies.
The frequent changes to these regulations present a business risk for their
operations.

c. Litigation Risk
A third business risk associated with cannabis regulations is the
potential for product recalls and individual or class action lawsuits if
cannabis produced and sold does not meet Health Canada standards. For
example, OrganiGram, New Brunswick’s largest licensed supplier of
medical marijuana, was accused of selling pesticide contaminated
products in 2016, which resulted in product recalls in 2016 and 2017.34 In
response, a class action suit was certified on January 18, 2019, by the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court.35 The plaintiffs in the class action are seeking

30

CannTrust to Destroy C$77 Million Worth of Plants, Inventory to Regain Compliance,
REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2019), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-canada-cannabiscanntrust/canntrust-to-destroy-c77-million-worth-of-plants-inventory-to-regaincompliance-idUSKBN1WT25X.
31
Id.
32
The Canadian Press, CannTrust Laying Off up to 140 People as it Works to Regain
Cannabis
Licenses,
CBC
NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2019),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/canntrust-layoffs-cannabis-licenses-1.5335100.
33
Id.
34
Downton v. Organigram Holdings, Inc., [2019] N.S.R. 2d, paras. 29, 33, 38-39 (Can.).
35
Id. at ¶ 368.
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damages for experiencing adverse health effects because of the
contamination.36 OrganiGram has insurance that will cover the cost of
legal fees and may also cover any monetary damages associated with the
suit.37 Unlike with CannTrust and Bonify, OrganiGram’s license has not
been suspended, and it can still generate revenues. However, the
consequences to its reputation may negatively affect its sales, which could
lead to financial issues.
There is also a risk that cannabis companies could be held responsible
for health problems caused by their product, even if they met Health
Canada regulations. Courts in both Canada and the United States are
adjudicating lawsuits in which governments are seeking to recoup
healthcare costs from tobacco companies and opioid manufacturers.38 In
Canada, these claims are expected to run into the tens of billions of
dollars.39
Despite legalization, provincial governments warn consumers that
cannabis can cause lung problems similar to smoking tobacco, mental
health challenges, and low birthweight and learning difficulties for babies
exposed to cannabis in utero.40 The Canadian Paediatric Society has
counseled that teenagers and young adults should not use cannabis because

36

Id. at ¶ 4.
Class-Action Lawsuit Against OrganiGram Gets Green Light, CBC NEWS (Jan. 21,
2019),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/class-action-lawsuit-medicalcannabis-organigram-1.4986632.
38
See, e.g., Brendan Pierson, Factbox: The U.S. Opioid Epidemic in the Courts, REUTERS
(Sept.
16,
2019),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-opioids-litigationfactbox/factbox-the-u-s-opioid-epidemic-in-the-courts-idUSKBN1W11U8;
Richard
Wolf, Supreme Court Won’t Block Smokers’ Lawsuits Against Big Tobacco Companies,
U.S.A.
TODAY
(Feb.
25,
2019),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/02/25/supreme-court-wont-blocklawsuits-against-major-tobacco-companies/2978663002/ (American examples); Sammy
Hudes, Alberta to Join B.C. in Class Action Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturers,
CALGARY HERALD (Oct. 15, 2019), http://calgaryherald.com/news/politics/alberta-to-joinb-c-in-class-action-lawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers; Thomas Mulier & Sandrine
Rastello, Big Tobacco’s Legal Woes in Canada Pose its Biggest Risk in Decades,
FINANCIAL POST (Mar. 20, 2019), http://business.financialpost.com/news/retailmarketing/big-tobaccos-legal-woes-in-canada-pose-biggest-risk-in-decades
(Canadian
examples).
39
Hudes, supra note 38; Mulier & Rastello, supra note 38.
40
Cannabis
and
Your
Health,
HEALTHLINKBC
(Oct.
10,
2018),
http://www.healthlinkbc.ca/health-topics/cannabis-your-health.
37
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it has the potential to irreversibly change brain development.41
Manufacturers of cannabis-related paraphernalia are also potentially at
risk of litigation for health problems, as illustrated by growing concerns
and cases against vaping companies.42
Publicly traded firms can also face legal action related to securities
violations. Once the public became aware of CannTrust’s potentially
unlicensed production, a complaint was filed with the Ontario Securities
Commission (OSC).43 The complaint questioned if CannTrust was
engaged in fraud and intentionally putting investors at risk by not
disclosing the fact that they were wilfully contravening regulations.44 The
OSC opened a quasi-criminal investigation to investigate the allegation of
fraud, which carries a penalty of up to five years in jail and fines of up to
$5 million per conviction.45 Outside of the OSC investigation, 14 law
firms, 13 from the U.S. and one from Canada, have initiated class action
lawsuits against CannTrust.46 The Canadian law firm, Strosberg Sasso
Sutts LLP, located in Windsor, Ontario, is seeking $250 million in
damages for negligent misrepresentation and liability for primary market
misrepresentation and secondary market disclosure pursuant to the
Securities Act.47

41

Christina N. Grant & Richard E. Bélanger, Position Statement: Cannabis and Canada’s
Children and Youth, CANADIAN PEDIATRIC SOCIETY (May 3, 2017),
http://www.cps.ca/en/documents/position/cannabis-children-and-youth.
42
See Will Stone, Some States with Legal Weed Embrace Vaping Bans, Warn of BlackMarket Risks, N.P.R. (Oct. 26, 2019), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2019/10/26/770377080/some-states-with-legal-weed-embrace-vaping-bans-warnof-black-market-risks.
43
Victor Ferreira, OSC Complaint, Class-Action Lawsuits Could Add to CannTrust’s
Woes,
FINANCIAL
POST
(July
15,
2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-business/osc-complaint-class-actionlawsuits-could-add-to-canntrusts-woes.
44
Id.
45
Barbara Shecter & Vanmala Subramanian, OSC Pursuing CannTrust Investigation as
‘Quasi-Criminal’
Case,
FINANCIAL
POST
(Aug.
2,
2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/osc-pursuing-canntrust-investigation-as-quasicriminal-case.
46
Ferreira, supra note 40.
47
CannTrust Holdings Inc. Class Action, STROSBERG SASSO SUTTS LLP (July 10, 2019),
http://www.strosbergco.com/class-actions/canntrust/; Strosberg Sasso Sutts LLP
Announces a Class Action Against CannTrust Holdings Inc., FINANCIAL POST (July 11,
2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/pmn/press-releases-pmn/business-wire-newsreleases-pmn/strosberg-sasso-sutts-llp-announces-a-class-action-against-canntrustholdings-inc. See also Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5, §§ 1, 130 (Can.).
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When licensed producers and sellers gain access to the cannabis
industry, good production practices with permitted chemicals and
pesticides will reduce the risk of costly legal proceedings and reputational
harm that can occur from product recalls and investigations. Additionally,
with strict regulations, cannabis businesses, especially large publicly
traded ones, need to safeguard against unauthorized activities that
contravene securities law, affect market share, put investors at risk, and
bring about unwanted legal proceedings.

d. Licensing
Due to restrictions on the number of detail locations in some
provinces, illegal dispensaries have become relatively prevalent. In
Ontario, where there are currently only twenty-five licensed cannabis
retailers for 14.5 million people, Toronto officials have laid forty-one
charges related to non-licensed cannabis dispensaries.48 At the time of
writing, there are thirty-two illegal dispensaries operating in the city,
despite the potential fines of up to $1 million.49 Part of the incentive is
that illegal dispensaries can make in excess of $20,000 in sales daily.50
This profitability results in shuttered illegal dispensaries often re-opening
in a different location with a different name.
These dispensaries, however, are not without risk for landlords. Those
who rent commercial space to illegal dispensaries may be liable for
criminal charges and steep fines. If charged and found guilty, commercial
landlords renting to illegal cannabis dispensaries can be imprisoned for up
to two years or be fined up to $250,000.51 Even before the legal process
determines if these remedies are appropriate, the municipality could issue
an interim closure order, which deprives the landlord of income, and could
result in mortgage default or foreclosure.52 Additionally, the Crown can
seize the property if it can illustrate that it was used for an unlawful

48

City Pushing for Closure of 21 Illegal Cannabis Shops but Still Faces Uphill Battle, CBC
NEWS (Apr. 17, 2019), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/toronto/illegal-cannabis-storestoronto-mark-sraga-1.5101325 [hereinafter, Illegal Cannabis Shops].
49
Cannabis Control Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 26, Sched. 1, § 6 (Can.).
50
Illegal Cannabis Shops, supra note 48.
51
Cannabis Control Act, supra note 49 at §§ 13(1), 23(1).
52
David S. Reiter & Brian Chung, The Ontario Cannabis Control Act and Implications for
Commercial
Landlord,
AIRD
&
BERLIS
LLP
(Apr.
24,
2019),
http://www.airdberlis.com/insights/publications/publication/the-ontario-cannabis-controlact-and-implications-for-commercial-landlords.
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activity.53 The Crown can also make an order for the forfeiture of any
proceeds of unlawful activity, including rental payments received from a
tenant operating an illegal dispensary.54 This order does not have to
accompany a conviction; rather, it can be made when charges are laid.55
Therefore, commercial landlords can be put in unpredictable situations if
they are leasing commercial space to a dispensary operating without a
license. Landlords need to know precisely who they are renting their space
to in order to prevent receipt of a fine or being subject to a forfeiture.

III.

CAPITAL MARKETS ACCEPTANCE

By one measure, the cannabis industry has been successful in seeking
capital in the financial markets. In fact, the industry has been so successful
at raising money that it has led to concerns that the market is overcapitalized. For example, in 2018, Tilray’s shares soared more than
1,000%, making its market capitalization larger than that of major
established companies, surpassing American Airlines.56 When cannabis
was first legalized, the market capitalization of the industry as a whole in
Canada exceeded that of publicly traded grocery stores, implying that
consumers would spend more on cannabis than on groceries.57 In the longrun, it was unlikely that a mature industry with established players selling
necessities would be surpassed by a novel sector selling recreational
products. After a strong initial debut, the stock prices of major cannabis
companies have declined by more than 50%.58 Despite this slide, there are
very few indications that cannabis companies are not able to receive
adequate funding from the capital markets.
Another important source of revenue for these new companies is
access to credit at affordable rates. However, while the legal cannabis
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Civil Remedies Act, S.O. 2001, c. 28, § 8(1) (Can.).
Reiter & Chung, supra note 49.
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Id.
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Sarah Halzack, The Cannabis Market is Looking Up, Even if Cannabis Stocks Aren’t,
BNN BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 2019), http://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/the-cannabis-market-islooking-up-even-if-cannabis-stocks-aren-t-1.1318673.
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Victor Ferreira, Feeling Burned: The First Year of Legal Cannabis has Been a Complete
Disaster
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Investors,
FINANCIAL
POST
(Oct.
9,
2019),
http://business.financialpost.com/cannabis/cannabis-business/cannabis-investing/feelingburned-the-first-year-of-legal-cannabis-has-been-a-complete-disaster-for-investors.
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industry is growing exponentially, institutional investment in the cannabis
industry by Canadian banks is lagging behind.59 Banks have been hesitant
to invest in cannabis-related businesses out of fear of reputational harm
and the high-risks associated with new industries.60 The Royal Bank of
Canada explicitly said that it would not provide banking services to
companies “engaged in the production and distribution of marijuana.”61
Additionally, in an effort to manage risk, Scotiabank has made the decision
to “prohibit the opening of accounts for customers classified as a
'marijuana-related business.'”62
Since the legalization of recreational cannabis, credit unions, which
provide financial services to its embers on a cooperative basis, have taken
the lead in extending credit to the legal cannabis industry.63 For example,
Alterna Savings & Credit Union Ltd. was the first financial institution to
lend money to a cannabis company in Ontario.64 The company, Canopy
Growth, is now the largest publicly traded cannabis producer in the
world.65 Since that first investment, Alterna has made approximately $750
million in cannabis-related loans and deposits, which is estimated to be
distributed amongst sixty licensed cannabis producers in Canada.66 In a
similar vein, the Windsor Family Credit Union recently lent $25 million
(USD) to Aphria Inc, a Canadian medical marijuana company.67 Although
cannabis-related companies are obtaining credit through credit unions, the
joy may be short-lived, as interest rates for these loans are often well above
normal averages. Some loans to cannabis-related businesses require

59

Bank Act, S.C. 1991, C. 46, § 2 (Can.); Jonathan Schwarzberg, Banks Pass on Marijuana
Loans, For Now, REUTERS (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/marijuanaloans/banks-pass-on-marijuana-loans-for-now-idUSL2N1XD0MN.
60
Schwarzberg, supra note 56.
61
Alexandra Posadzki, 2 of Canada’s Top Banks Back Away From Marijuana Industry,
CBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/banks-marijuana-business1.3757927.
62
Id.
63
See Credit Unions and Caisses Populaires Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, C. 11, § 24 (Can.); see
also supra note 59 at § 12.1(1) (discussing the roles or capabilities of federal credit unions);
Pot Sector Too Risky for Big Banks: Report, ADVISOR’S EDGE (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://www.advisor.ca/news/industry-news/pot-sector-too-risky-for-big-banks-report/.
64
Doug Alexander, Meet the Weed Banker Who Took a Chance on Canopy After the Big
Five Just Said No, BNN BLOOMBERG (Apr. 3, 2018), http://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/weedbanker-snags-600-million-in-business-as-rivals-just-say-no-1.1045190.
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Id.
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interest rates of up to 15%.68 The average prime interest rate charged by
the Bank of Canada and other financial institutions is currently 3.95%.69
Even major players, such as Aphria and Canopy, are paying higher interest
rates than they would receive through banks, at between 4.68% and 10%,
depending on the loan.70 With relatively high interest rates accompanying
loans granted by credit unions, it is important to determine whether
cannabis-related businesses, especially those that are beginning
operations, will have the capacity to generate enough revenue to manage
the loans that they have acquired.
It is important to note that, while there was initial hesitation from
Canadian banks, some banks are warming up to the idea of providing loans
to cannabis-related businesses. In 2018, the Bank of Montreal (BMO) led
a $175 million financing through the sale of shares for Canopy Growth,
and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) was a part of a $20
million credit deal with MedReleaf Corp.71 In 2019, BMO and CIBC,
along with Concentra Bank, provided up to $80 million in secured
financing to PharmHouse Inc., a medical marijuana company.72 BMO and
CIBC collaborated once again to provide a $65 million secured term loan
to Cronos Group, and a $65 million secured term loan to HEXO.73 RBC,
although initially against providing services to cannabis-related
businesses, participated in its first share sale involving CannTrust, valued
at $200 million.74 If banks continue to provide loans to cannabis-related
businesses, at average interest rates, their capacity to remain in business
will increase, reducing the likelihood of loan default and bankruptcy.
Further, providing credit and financial services to a wide spectrum of
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cannabis businesses, both large and small, will ensure diversity in the
Canadian legal cannabis market, and contribute positively to its growth.

IV.

INSOLVENCY PROCESSES AND CHALLENGES

a. Overview
Despite the novelty of the industry, some cannabis companies have
already filed for creditor protection, or bankruptcy and insolvency
protection. The first reorganization was for Peloton Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
which conducted research to develop, produce, and distribute
pharmaceutical-grade cannabis. While waiting for their Health Canada
permit, the company hired staff and prepared the working area in the
cultivation facility.75 These expenses of maintaining these operations
became too onerous to cover without income, leading the company to file
a proposal for reorganization in 2016.76 Public documents reveal that it
had 53 unsecured creditors and one preferred creditor with liabilities
totaling $5,329,460.45. With a total of $788,205.44 in assets, Peloton had
a deficit of $4,541,255.01.77 Pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency
Act (BIA), the interim receiver was given the power to possess Peloton’s
property, solicit buyers and investors of the company’s assets, and share
capital. Peloton’s proposal for reorganization was approved by the Court,
and the company was ultimately acquired by Aurora Cannabis for $7
million.78
A second example of a Canadian cannabis company involved in
insolvency proceedings comes from British Columbia. Ascent Industries
Corp., under its subsidiary Agrima Botanicals Corp., filed for creditor
protection under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA)79

75

Proposal, In re Peloton Pharmaceuticals Inc., 2017 QQCS 1165, No 41-2135897 (Can.
Que.
S.C.),
https://media.cdn.raymondchabot.com/app/uploads/2019/10/avis-de-laproposition-aux-cranciers_11112016.pdf.
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Id. at ¶ 4.
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Proposal, In re Peloton Pharmaceuticals Inc. at ¶. 174., 2017 QQCS 1165 (Can. Que.
S.C.). See also Jacob Serebrin, Aurora Cannabis Gets Go-Ahead to Grow Pot in PointClaire, MONTREAL GAZETTE (May 29, 2018), http://montrealgazette.com/business/auroracannabis-gets-go-ahead-to-grow-pot-in-pointe-claire>.
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after Health Canada suspended its license.80 The license was suspended in
September 2018 for failure to meet compliance requirements. Of particular
interest in this case is that Ascent has subsidiary companies in the U.S.,
but only one, which holds real property in Nevada, was a party to the
proceedings.81 That being said, the property located in Nevada is not
included in the listed assets for sale.82 A subsidiary of one of Ascent’s
secured creditors bought all of Ascent’s rights, titles and interests to
specific assigned contracts, intellectual property assets, personal property,
and real property for $29 million.83

b. Provincial Legislation
While these examples illustrate the availability of both of Canada’s
main bankruptcy and restructuring regimes (the BIA and the CCAA) to
cannabis companies, regulatory challenges in applying them remain. With
the federal legalization of recreational cannabis in Canada, provinces and
territories were able to develop their own legislation and regulations for
the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of cannabis. As a result,
there are 13 different systems managing cannabis and cannabis licenses
throughout Canada. Some provincial/territorial cannabis statutes
specifically outline what responsibilities licensees, trustees, and receivers
have during insolvency proceedings, some grant interim or temporary
licenses to trustees or creditors in possession, while others still are silent.
As a result, cannabis companies need to be cognizant of how their
respective province or territory treats insolvent cannabis companies.
In British Columbia, the Cannabis Control and Licensing Act84
includes a section that clearly explains who has specific rights and
responsibilities when a licensee goes bankrupt. Section 29(2) states:
If an interim receiver, receiver, custodian, trustee,
receiver manager or liquidator has been appointed under
the Business Corporations Act, the Law and Equity Act,

80

Filing for Creditor Protection at ¶ 5., 2019 BCSC 1880, No. S-192188 (Can. B.C.S.C.).
See also id. at s 3(1).
81
In re Ascent Industries Corp. et al. (Mar. 1, 2019) British Columbia S-192188 (Can.
B.C.S.C.) at ¶ 5. See also id at s 3(1).
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Id. at ¶ 9.
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Id. at ¶¶ 50-53.
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the Personal Property Security Act, the Supreme Court
Act, the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) or
the Winding-up and Restructuring Act (Canada) for a
licensee, the person appointed has the powers and
obligations of the licensee.
Although this is a simple statement, it removes any confusion that a
court appointed trustee or receiver might have when working on behalf of
a cannabis company.
In Newfoundland, the Cannabis Control Act85 allows for a temporary
cannabis license to be issued to a creditor in possession, or a trustee in
bankruptcy, for one year in order to dispose of the cannabis store or the
cannabis retail location.86 Similarly, Yukon’s Cannabis Control and
Regulation Act87 allows the Cannabis Licensing Board to issue a six month
interim license to an assignee, receiver, or trustee in bankruptcy if the
original licensee loses control of their business or premises.88 While
holding the interim license, the assignee, receiver, or trustee assumes all
privileges and liabilities of a licensee.89 Alberta’s Gaming, Liquor and
Cannabis Regulation90 also allows a temporary license for three months to
be issued to a person to carry on activities permitted by the original
licensee if they dispose of the business.91
Saskatchewan’s regime currently provides the most direction to
trustees and receivers for cannabis businesses. The Cannabis Authority has
the power to transfer a cannabis license if a trustee in bankruptcy or a
court-appointed receiver.92 If a cannabis license is cancelled and cannabis
is forfeited to the Cannabis Authority, the Cannabis Authority can request
the Court of Queen’s Bench to appoint a trustee, receiver, custodian,
receiver manager, or liquidator to manage the forfeited cannabis.93 Further,
when a trustee, receiver, custodian, receiver manager, or liquidator is
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Cannabis Control and Licensing Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 19 (Can.).
Id. at § 40.
87
Cannabis Control Regulation Act, S.Y., c.4 (Can.).
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Id. at § 38(1).
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Id. at § 38(5).
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Id. at § 115.
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appointed, they have the power to, “sell, dispose of or otherwise deal with
the cannabis, and distribute any proceeds from the cannabis in a manner
directed by the court.”94
Clarity about the transferability of the cannabis license, and the duties
of the trustee, receiver, or assigner are vital for insolvency practitioners
navigating this new industry. However, at the time of writing, only five of
the 13 provinces and territories have legislation or regulations that address
insolvency processes and the status of the cannabis license during
insolvency. To help ensure the orderly restructuring or unwinding of
cannabis businesses, the remaining provinces and territories should add
guidance about insolvency to their cannabis statutes.

c. Cannabis on Reserves
The Cannabis Act currently has no framework for the sale of cannabis
on First Nation Reserves, despite sustained concerns regarding the lack of
engagement with First Nation communities during the legislative
process.95 Given the lack of consultation with First Nations communities
and the increasing recognition of Indigenous sovereignty, the Senate
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples recommended that the bill’s
implementation be delayed by a year.96 This suggestion was not adopted.97
Instead, the government has started consultations with First Nations
groups with an aim of amending the Cannabis Act to better reflect
Indigenous concerns. However, the regulation of cannabis on reserve is
tied up in larger questions about Indigenous sovereignty. Some
communities want a continued ban on cannabis on their lands – a decision

94

Id. at § 3–15(7).
Jesse Donovan, Canada and the Provinces Should Respect Indigenous Communities’
Right to Either Develop Cannabis-Related Opportunities or to Prohibit Cannabis, IRPP
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/august-2019/canada-mustrespect-indigenous-cannabis-laws/; Konstantia Koutouki & Katherine Lofts, Cannabis,
Reconciliation, and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Prospects and Challenges for
Cannabis Legalization in Canada, 56:3 ALTA. L. REV. 709, 710 (2019) (“Th[e] omission
[of Indigenous communities] has sparked outcry on the part of Indigenous peoples across
Canada, who have also expressed concern over the lack of adequate consultation by the
government, the application of provincial regulations on reserves and traditional territories,
and the exclusion of First Nations from the law’s excise tax revenue sharing framework,
among other issues.”).
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which the federal government has pledged to support.98 The regulatory
framework becomes even more complicated for First Nations who want to
take advantage of the opportunities presented by cannabis or have been
operating dispensaries for decades. Numerous communities have taken the
position that the federal and provincial regulations do not apply to their
lands.99 Others have passed their own laws that meet or exceed the
requirements off-reserve.100 These laws have led to questions about how
these communities would enforce their regulations, and about their
validity where they conflict with federal legislation.101
Another point of contention with the status quo on cannabis is that
First Nations communities currently have no mechanism to collect
revenues from cannabis sales. Currently, the federal and provincial
governments split the excise taxes received from cannabis.102 Even if
cannabis is sold on reserve, there is no formal way that the band council
or other governmental body can directly benefit from it. Before the writs
were drawn up for the 2019 federal election, the government had been
working with First Nations groups to develop a workable revenue-sharing
and jurisdictional arrangement.103 The Commissioner of the First Nations
Tax Commission has proposed that First Nations should be able to keep
75-100% of the excise or commodity taxes generated from cannabis sales
on reserve.104 These controversial topics are unlikely to be resolved in the
near future.105
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Provincial governments are also struggling with how best to address
the question of dispensaries on-reserve. Some provinces have encouraged
these businesses to apply for a license, while others have set up a lottery
specifically for them.106 At the time of writing, there are many dispensaries
on reserve which are operating without a license. In Ontario, the provincial
police estimate that there are 79 unlicensed cannabis distributors operating
on 23 First Nations.107 As with federal government regulations, it remains
to be seen if provincial regulations will be enforced on reserve. Some
illegal dispensaries have been raided, although there does not appear to be
widespread enforcement.108
In an insolvency situation, First Nations cannabis businesses could
face additional complexities than those off-reserve. Creditors will have
different recourse to satisfy unpaid debts depending on the corporate
structure of the business. If it was incorporated by a band or Indigenous
person, the distinct legal character of the corporation would allow the
creditor to proceed as they would off-reserve.109 However, if a cannabis
dispensary was set-up as a sole proprietorship, partnership, or by the band
itself, most secured creditors would have no recourse for default.110 This
is because the Indian Act prevents banks or other lenders from attaching
their loan to property situated on reserve unless they are a band or another
“Indian” as defined by the Act.111

V.

AREAS FOR REFORM & POINTS OF CLARIFICATION

This section draws on the Canadian experience to suggest best
practices that should be followed to ensure that cannabis companies are
not treated differently than any other legitimate business regarding
bankruptcy relief.
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Countries looking to legalize recreational cannabis should do so at the
federal level before the regional, provincial, or state level governments
have the ability to do so. This will ensure that the entire country will have
uniform standards enforced, despite the slightly different regulatory
schemes at the local level. If recreational cannabis legalization occurs at
the federal level first, all other federal laws and regulations should be
updated to ensure that there are no operability issues.
A second consideration that needs to be addressed is the appropriate
level of supply. If there are no limits on the number of licenses that can be
issued, there may be more supply than demand, which can result in
companies going bankrupt. Some jurisdictions are restricting the number
of licenses available due to concerns of oversupply. However, avoiding
bankruptcy cannot be the only concern for governments regulating the
cannabis industry. Too much intervention in the name of preventing
oversaturation can lead to diminished supply and inefficiencies. Before
legalization, some scholars argued that placing a cap on cannabis retail
licenses would only benefit the black market, as supply and wait times for
cannabis would be an issue.112 Their warning has been proven correct by
Ontario’s experience with legalization. On the day that all licensed
storefronts were expected to begin operations, only nine of the twenty-five
officially opened their doors to the public.113 Not only does an inadequate
supply encourage cannabis consumers to seek the product on the black
market, depriving governments of potential tax revenue, it undercuts the
regulations aimed to protect consumers. If a surplus of businesses can
satisfy Health Canada’s requirements, the market will self-adjust to
resolve concerns about market oversaturation.
Further, even though the initial number of licensed retailers was low,
supplier of Canadian cannabis are now expected to rapidly increase.114
One analyst predicts that Canada will experience an oversupply of
112
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cannabis in its dried form by January 2020.115 This oversupply is
anticipated to lead to a new problem – getting it to market. The analyst
predicted that there would be enough dried cannabis to supply 617 retail
stores, yet there will only be 400 operational cannabis stores by the end
of 2019.116 Additionally, with cannabis-infused edibles, extracts, and
topicals recently becoming legal, some cannabis consumers may turn to
the edible market and from dried cannabis – making the issue of
oversupply even more challenging and hard to predict in the short-term.117
A third area of potential reform is the restrictions on license ownership
or concentration. While some provinces and territories do not limit the
number of licenses that can be issued, there are instances where a single
entity or person is capped to a specific number of cannabis retail licenses
in a given province or territory. For example, Alberta Gaming, Liquor and
Cannabis does not place a limit on the number of retail cannabis licenses
that can be issued. However, no person or entity can hold more than 15%
of the total retail cannabis licenses in the province.118 Therefore, if 200
retail licenses were issued, a single person or entity could only possess 30
of them. Until December 31, 2020, an individual or entity can only hold a
maximum of 42 licenses.119
Similarly, British Columbia, which also does not cap the number of
retail licenses that can be issued, only allows a single entity to hold a
maximum of eight licenses.120 Saskatchewan, which initially issued 51
cannabis retail licenses, does not limit on the number of licenses that a
person or entity can possess. In fact, Saskatchewan’s cannabis regulations
allow a license holder to sell their interest in their cannabis retail store
license.121 As a result, larger cannabis companies have bought out many
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smaller cannabis businesses. Of the 51 licensed cannabis retail stores in
Saskatchewan, only 34 are currently in operation. When the licenses were
first issued, Canopy Growth, operating under its subsidiary Tweed,
Westleaf, and Fire & Flower Holdings Corp., only owned seven.122 These
companies now hold 17 of the 34 operating licenses, or 50% of the retail
cannabis market in the province.123
Monopolization can be problematic because consumers are limited in
their product selection, and smaller independent retailers are often shut out
of the market. These pressures can limit innovation and entrepreneurship.
As a result, provinces and territories that do not limit the number of
licenses a single entity or person can hold should consider whether or not
it will provide their economy with sufficient diversity of choice.

VI.

CANADIAN BANKRUPTCY
COMPANIES

FOR

AMERICAN CANNABIS

Similar to Canada, the federal level of government has jurisdiction
over bankruptcy in the United States. This constitutional distinction is
relevant since cannabis remains illegal federally, despite its legalization in
a number of states.124 As a result, bankruptcy trustees have refused to
liquidate the assets of marijuana companies, and sought to dismiss the
restructuring plans of a cannabis company that proposed to pay creditors
with funds from marijuana sales.125 This prohibition applies even for
corporations that supply cannabis-related companies. For example, in In
re Way to Grow Inc., et al,126 the debtor’s reorganization plan was rejected
by the Court because it depended on sales of “equipment, chemical,
product or material which may be used to manufacture a controlled
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substance.”127 Some states have attempted to bridge this gap by amending
their receivership laws to benefit marijuana-based companies, but the
broad relief of bankruptcy remains unavailable.128
The inability of American cannabis companies to access bankruptcy
relief through federal bankruptcy courts creates a significant opportunity
for Canada. American cannabis companies that are publicly traded in
Canada may be able to take advantage of our insolvency regime for
cannabis companies.129 If a parent company is located in Canada, it is
possible that subsidiaries located in the U.S. will enjoy the benefits of
federal legalization of recreational cannabis in Canada. This may
encourage American cannabis companies to set up their operations
strategically to give them a safety net if things go wrong.
American cannabis companies with a presence in Canada may also be
able to utilize Chapter 15 bankruptcy proceedings to restructure a business
or liquidate assets that would otherwise be illegal in the U.S. Chapter 15
bankruptcy proceedings provide mechanisms for dealing with crossborder insolvency cases to protect the interests of creditors and the debtor
involved in the proceeding.130 Additionally, unlike other types of
bankruptcy proceedings in the American system, Chapter 15 proceedings
do not create an estate of the debtor’s property.131 Therefore, the American
trustee does not need to possess or administer cannabis related assets or
financial proceeds.132 However, if a Chapter 15 debtor is seeking
recognition of a Canadian court’s insolvency proceedings, the trustee may
argue that the recognition should not be allowed as it is against public
policy of the United States given the federal ban on cannabis.133 To help
guide the application of the public policy exception provided for in section
1506 of the Bankruptcy Code, three principles have been identified:
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(1) The mere fact of conflict between foreign law and U.S.
law, absent other considerations, is insufficient to support
the invocation of the public policy exception.
(2) Deference to a foreign proceeding should not be
afforded in a Chapter 15 proceeding where the procedural
fairness of the foreign proceeding is in doubt or cannot be
cured by the adoption of additional protections.
(3) An action should not be taken in a Chapter 15
proceeding where taking such action would frustrate a
U.S. court's ability to administer the Chapter 15
proceeding and/or would impinge severely a U.S.
constitutional or statutory right, particularly if a party
continues to enjoy the benefits of the Chapter 15
proceeding.134
In short, Chapter 15 can allow for circumstances where American
companies reorganized in other countries could benefit from options they
would not be able to if the proceedings had happened in the United States.
One example of this is with non-debtor third-party involuntary releases.
This mechanism to exculpate non-debtor officers and directors from
liability is not widely available in domestic restructurings in the U.S..135 In
contrast, a non-debtor release was enforced by the Bankruptcy Court after
being ordered by a court in Ontario.136 This experience illustrates that
Chapter 15 could be used to the benefit of insolvent cannabis companies,
even while the federal prohibition remains in place domestically.

VII.

CONCLUSION

Developing the regulatory framework for a new industry is always
challenging for policymakers. This is especially so for the legalized
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cannabis industry, which, unlike other new industries, had millions of
interested consumers on the first day it became legal. The controversy over
legalization also ensured that the industry would be tightly regulated by
governments. While some of these choices speak to the safety of the
product, many have had a dramatic effect on framing the business risk in
the sector. The Canadian experience is already beginning to illustrate the
effects of these policy choices on the business risks faced by cannabis
entrepreneurs. These challenges include the ever-changing and sometimes
overlapping regulatory landscape, over/under supply, and market
concentration.
These policy choices can have consequences for any industry.
However, they are felt particularly acutely by this nascent sector that has
often struggled to meet the demand of millions of Canadians. Coupled
with the expectations of a “green gold rush,” it is inevitable that some of
these new companies will fail. Clear procedures and responsibilities, as in
Saskatchewan’s laws, would be a good exemplar for other provinces to
consider. The lack of insolvency proceedings south of the border also
makes it more likely that our courts will need to contend with a higher
number of cannabis bankruptcies – presenting both a unique opportunity
and major challenges. Policymakers should begin preparing for this
eventuality while this young sector is still growing to ensure that all parties
involved understand what happens when things go wrong.

